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The Montana Constitution includes both a right to know and a right to
privacy. These rights are implicated and in conflict when the release of
governmental information is at issue. Additionally, the federal Family Edu-
cational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), Montana statutes, and the Uni-
versity of Montana’s Student Code of Conduct bar the release of students’
educational records to third parties, except under specific circumstances. In
Krakauer v. State ex rel. Christian1 (“Krakauer II”), the Montana Supreme
Court merged these privacy protections to form a new standard governing
the release of student records. The Court enhanced student privacy rights
with applicable federal, state, and University statutes but declined to bolster
the right to know with those statutes’ exceptions.
The decision in Krakauer II demonstrates the Court’s shift from the
longstanding principles of open government toward an emphasis on individ-
ual privacy. Part II of this Note examines the history of Montana’s right to
know and right to privacy, as well as the legal framework controlling the
release of governmental records. A background of Krakauer v. State ex rel.
Christian2 (“Krakauer I”) and Krakauer II is provided in Part III. Part IV
analyzes the Court’s application of the relevant laws in Krakauer II and the
impact the decision will have on future cases involving the release of gov-
ernmental records.
II. BACKGROUND
Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution encompasses “the
right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public
bodies or agencies of state government”—the now well-recognized “right
to know.”3 Citizens shall not be deprived of this right “except in cases in
which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public
* Student, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, J.D. candidate,
2022. I would like to thank Professor Anthony Johnstone for sharing his wisdom and insight and provid-
ing invaluable guidance on this article. And many thanks to my friends and family, especially my hus-
band Eric, for the love and support as I navigated this writing process.
1. 445 P.3d 201 (Mont. 2019) [hereinafter Krakauer II].
2. 381 P.3d 524 (Mont. 2016) [hereinafter Krakauer I].
3. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9.
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disclosure.”4 It should be noted at the outset that the “clearly exceeds” lan-
guage found within the right to know creates a “constitutional presumption
that . . . [public officials’] records are amenable to public inspection.”5 The
right to know finds a competing companion in Article II, Section 10, the
constitutional right to privacy.6
The rights’ coexistence creates a natural tension and has “attracted,
and arguably necessitated, a healthy rash of litigation.”7 The Montana Su-
preme Court has relied on a variety of tests when balancing the weight of
the right to know and the right to privacy. Since the rights were adopted
nearly 50 years ago, the right to know has often reigned supreme. However,
the Court’s more recent decisions, including the Krakauer line of cases,
indicate a shift in favor of privacy. Additionally, the Court has examined
special cases in which federal and state laws provide protections for certain
individuals’ privacy of records but also include exceptions for disclosure
under specific circumstances. The unique issue of student disciplinary re-
cord privacy was raised in Krakauer II. As discussed below, the Court’s
holding resulted in an unbalanced distribution of applicable law and con-
flicted with the constitutional presumption in favor of the right to know.
A. Montana’s Constitutional Tension and Balance Between the Right to
Know and Right to Privacy
1. Origins of Montana’s Right to Know
No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe
the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its
subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy
clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 9
The Constitutional Convention Studies produced by various research-
ers ahead of the 1972 Constitutional Convention provide valuable context
for the delegates’ drafting of Montana’s right to know. Constitutional Con-
vention Study No. 10 chronicles the “long-standing principle of democratic
theory . . . that the activities of government be public at all levels.”8 Evi-
dence and support of this theory in the United States can be traced as far
back as the writings of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.9 The right to
4. Id.
5. Great Falls Tribune v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 82 P.3d 876, 886 (Mont. 2003).
6. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
7. Rick Applegate, The 1972 Montana State Constitution Declaration of Rights and the Opportu-
nities on the Bumpy Road Ahead, 43 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 103, 122 (2020).
8. RICK APPLEGATE, BILL OF RIGHTS 111 (Mont. Constitutional Convention Comm’n, Constitu-
tional Convention Study No. 10, 1972).
9. Id.
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know at the state level developed alongside the federal Freedom of Infor-
mation Act and the associated difficulties of “reorienting government to a
disclosure-oriented posture rather than one that is withholding-oriented.”10
When the delegates drafted the right to know in the early 1970s, most
states, including Montana, had already codified the right to know in the
form of open meeting and open record laws and constitutional provisions on
open legislative deliberations.11 Against this legislative backdrop and the
history summarized in Constitutional Convention Study No. 10, the dele-
gates made the openness of government permanent as the constitutional
right to know. The express nature of the right “gives [it] more prominence
than it has in most other states.”12 Accordingly, since the right’s adoption,
the Montana Supreme Court has remained “particularly vigilant and uncom-
promising in protecting” the right to know.13
2. Origins of Montana’s Right to Privacy
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 10
Constitutional Convention Study No. 10 also provides perspective on
the origins of Montana’s right to privacy.14 Individual privacy rights devel-
oped in part from an essay written by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in
1890.15 The essay articulated the need for legal protection for privacy not
only in tangible property but also the “intangible factors of life.”16 Subse-
quent U.S. Supreme Court cases defined and expanded the right to privacy
and today it is recognized in most states.17
Montana courts have recognized privacy in various forms, including
the right of personal security, of personal liberty, to be let alone, and to
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.18 Montana is also one of only eleven
states to express a right to privacy in its Constitution.19 The express nature
10. Id. at 112–13.
11. Id. at 113.
12. Adam Wade, Note, Billings Gazette v. City of Billings: Examining Montana’s New Exception to
the Public’s Right to Know, 76 MONT. L. REV. 186 (2015).
13. Id. at 188 (quoting Fritz Snyder, The Right to Participate and the Right to Know in Montana, 66
MONT. L. REV. 297, 311 (2005) (citing Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of the Sup. Ct. of Mont., 995
P.2d 923, 946 (Mont. 2000) (Nelson, J., dissenting))).
14. APPLEGATE, supra note 8, at 215.
15. Id. at 238.
16. Id. at 238 (referencing Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, HARV. L. REV.
4 (1890)).
17. Id. at 238–39.
18. See, e.g., Welsh v. Pritchard, 241 P.2d 816, 819 (Mont. 1952).
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of the right provides more protection than even the United States Constitu-
tion.20
3. The Montana Supreme Court’s Development of Balancing Tests and
Shift Toward Enhanced Privacy Rights
Since their adoption in 1972, the right to know and right to privacy
have conflicted in a multitude of cases. Prior to the early 1980s, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court determined the outcome of this conflict by balancing
the demand of individual privacy with the merits of disclosure—the test
encompassed by the right to know. Again, it is critical to note the “clearly
exceeds” language found within the constitutional right to know. In fact,
during deliberations at the Constitutional Convention, “[a] key turning point
. . . occurred when the right [to know] was revised offline so that the de-
mand of individual privacy had to ‘clearly’ exceed the merits of public dis-
closure.”21
The Court has also specified the right to know balancing test must be
conducted “within the context of the facts of each case” and is dependent on
public interest.22 Over the decades, the importance of disclosure has often
outweighed the benefits of concealment and confidentiality in Montana
courts,23 aligning the decisions with the presumption in favor of the right to
know. The right to know has outweighed the privacy interests of law en-
forcement officers, elected officials, public defenders, public school teach-
ers, and various other government employees.24 The Court has cautioned,
however, that “the right to know is not absolute.”25 The Court’s line of
cases in which these rights competed demonstrates the non-absolute nature
of both the right to know and right to privacy.
The Court gave significant weight to the right to privacy in 1982 by
turning away from right to know balancing when it decided Montana
Human Rights Division v. City of Billings.26 There, the disclosure of city
employees’ personnel files and disciplinary records was at issue.27 The
Court analyzed whether the state demonstrated a compelling interest that
overcame the right to privacy—the test encompassed in the constitutional
right to privacy.28 The Court then applied the Katz v. United States29 two-
20. Patricia A. Cain, The Right to Privacy Under the Montana Constitution: Sex and Intimacy, 64
MONT. L. REV. 99, 102 (2003).
21. Applegate, supra note 7, at 120–21.
22. Missoulian v. Board of Regents of Higher Educ., 675 P.2d 962, 971 (Mont. 1984).
23. Wade, supra note 12, at 187.
24. Id. at 189 n. 40.
25. Associated Press, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 4 P.3d 5, 10 (Mont. 2000).
26. 649 P.2d 1283 (Mont. 1982).
27. Id. at 1285.
28. Id. at 1285–86.
4
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part test for determining whether a constitutionally-protected right to pri-
vacy exists.30 The Katz test states the existence of the right to privacy de-
pends on (1) whether the person had an actual or subjective expectation of
privacy and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable.31 Critically, the Court made no mention of the right to know
under the state constitution whatsoever. This omission is significant be-
cause the Court has repeatedly relied on Montana Human Rights Division in
subsequent public record disclosure cases.32
The Court leaned further into its privacy analysis when it held that
whether an individual has an expectation of privacy depends on whether the
individual had notice the records were subject to public disclosure or were
already publicly available.33 This decision resulted in Havre Daily News,
LLC v. City of Havre,34 where a newspaper sought unredacted police re-
ports detailing alleged preferential treatment of an officer’s child.35 Similar
to the Montana Human Rights Division shift in focus to the privacy inquiry,
the Havre Daily News notice analysis has also continued to inform the
Court’s decisions on whether disclosure of governmental documents is war-
ranted.
In 1997, the Court held the right to privacy “encompasses not only
‘autonomy privacy’ but confidential ‘informational privacy’ as well.”36
However, in the same case—State v. Nelson37—the Court also held, “[i]n
requiring a ‘compelling state interest’ [the right to privacy] does not . . .
establish a new or heightened level of protection for any particular privacy
interest.”38 Thus, the breadth but not the level of the privacy right was ex-
panded.
The Court in Billings Gazette v. City of Billings39 again bolstered pri-
vacy rights by creating an exception to the right to know for public employ-
ees not in positions of “public trust.”40 Further, the Court stated, “general
assertions that public disclosure will foster public confidence in public in-
29. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30. Mont. Human Rights Div. v. Billings, 649 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Mont. 1982).
31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Peter Michael Meloy, Double and Nothing Open Government in Montana Under Article II,
Section 9 and Section 10, 79 MONT. L. REV. 49, 67 (2018).
33. Havre Daily News, LLC v. City of Havre, 142 P.3d 864, 871 (Mont. 2006).
34. 142 P.3d 864 (Mont. 2006).
35. Id. at 867–68.
36. State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 448 (Mont. 1997).
37. 941 P.2d 441 (Mont. 1997).
38. Id. at 449.
39. 313 P.3d 129 (Mont. 2013).
40. Wade, supra note 12, at 185; Billings Gazette, 313 P.3d at 140.
5
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stitutions and maintain accountability for public officers are not sufficient
to establish a strong public interest.”41
The Court has reviewed few cases in which the public has requested
student education or disciplinary records. In Board of Trustees, Cut Bank
Public Schools v. Cut Bank Pioneer Press42—the student records case most
relevant to Krakauer II—a newspaper requested a school board release the
disciplinary records of two students involved in shooting other students
with plastic BBs on school property.43 The Court again applied the two-step
Katz privacy analysis.44 In doing so, the Court stated the following:
It is clear that [the newspaper] is not requesting the identity of the students
involved in the BB shooting incident; rather, it simply wants to know what
disciplinary action the Board took. The discipline imposed by the Board on
students of the school, particularly students involved in potentially injurious
actions, is a matter of public concern. The Board’s assertion that unidenti-
fied students have a privacy interest in the disciplinary measures imposed
upon them which would prohibit a general report to the public about the
Board’s action in the matter is unpersuasive.45
Accordingly, the Court held, “[a]ny subjective expectation of privacy
here, given [the newspaper’s] limited request, would not be considered rea-
sonable by society and is outweighed by the merits of public disclosure.”46
The Montana Supreme Court’s historical treatment of the competing
constitutional rights leading up to Krakauer II was varied, and its analyses
have shifted back and forth between the tests surrounding each right. Gener-
ally, the Court has continued to honor the 1972 delegates’ intent in main-
taining an open government. However, as the cases noted above and the
Krakauer II decision suggest, the Court seems intent on shifting away from
decades of precedent favoring the public’s right to know in favor of protect-
ing the privacy rights of public and private citizens.
B. Special Considerations for Student Record Privacy under Federal,
State, and University Law
Federal, state, and University of Montana laws provide specific protec-
tions for student educational records in Montana. These protections include
significant exceptions, however, which must be accounted for when exam-
ining the laws’ interplay with the constitutional right to know and right to
privacy.
41. Billings Gazette, 313 P.3d at 141.
42. 160 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2007).
43. Id. at 483.
44. Id. at 488.
45. Id. at 489.
46. Id.
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 82 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-2\MON205.txt unknown Seq: 7 31-AUG-21 13:01
2021 STUDENT PRIVACY OVER RECORD DISCLOSURE 435
1. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) 20 U.S.C.A.
1232g
Congress enacted FERPA in 1974 to protect the privacy of students
and their parents.47 FERPA prohibits educational institutions from releasing
students’ education records or their personally identifiable information to
third parties and conditions the receipt of federal funding on compliance
with those procedures.48
FERPA includes two significant exceptions to its general prohibition
of disclosure, however. First, FERPA allows for the release of:
[T]he final results of any disciplinary proceeding . . . against a student who
is an alleged perpetrator of any crime of violence . . . or a nonforcible sex
offense, if the institution determines as a result of that disciplinary proceed-
ing that the student committed a violation of the institution’s rules or poli-
cies with respect to such crime or offense.49
Importantly, in Pioneer Press, the Montana Supreme Court held FERPA
does not prevent the public release of redacted student disciplinary
records.50 A second FERPA exception allows disclosure of student records
“in compliance with judicial order, or pursuant to any lawfully issued sub-
poena.”51
The Court in Krakauer I referenced the expanded definition of “per-
sonally identifiable information,” which includes “[i]nformation requested
by a person who the educational agency or institution reasonably believes
knows the identity of the student to whom the education record relates.”52
The student records at issue met that expanded definition, and thus, the
Court held the release of records would violate FERPA.53 Author John
Krakauer, the person seeking the student records, argued any funding loss
to the University was speculative, and further, the U.S. Department of Edu-
cation has never discontinued funds to educational institutions for FERPA
violations.54 The Court ordered the district court to determine on remand
whether there was an adverse final ruling against the student during his
47. John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) (20 U.S.C. § 1232g), 112 A.L.R. FED. 1, § 2(a) (Westlaw
through April 15, 2020).
48. Id. § 2(a).
49. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 § 1232g(b)(6)(B) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 116–259).
50. Board of Trustees, Cut Bank Public Schools v. Cut Bank Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d 482, 488
(Mont. 2007).
51. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 § 1232g(b)(2)(B) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 116–259).
52. 381 P.3d 524, 530 (Mont. 2016) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (Westlaw through April 15, 2020)).
53. Id. at 529.
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disciplinary proceedings, which would allow for the release of those records
under the FERPA disciplinary proceeding exception.55 However, the dis-
trict court did not make a finding on this exception, and did not discuss the
judicial order or subpoena exception.56
2. Montana Code Annotated § 20-25-515 Release of Student Records
Montana state law operates similarly to FERPA. Montana Code Anno-
tated § 20-25-515 codified a 1973 Act that stated the legislature intended
Montana university system institutions to respect students’ rights to privacy
in their records. Like FERPA, Montana’s law also allows record releases if
subpoenaed by a court.57
In Krakauer I, the Court read the state law not as restricting the excep-
tion to the issuance of an actual subpoena, but as simply requiring some
form of legal process by a court.58 However, merely filing a lawsuit and
requesting a records subpoena without a court’s consideration of a student’s
privacy interests would fail to satisfy the statute’s requirement that student
privacy be protected.59 Ultimately, the Court held the Montana Constitution
controls in student privacy cases, and the constitutional balancing test
needed to be completed before records could be released under state law or
FERPA.60
3. University of Montana Student Code of Conduct and Grizzly
Athletics Student-Athlete Handbook
The University of Montana Student Code of Conduct states the Uni-
versity “complies with the principles of privacy described in the Montana
Constitution, the Montana Code Annotated, and the federal Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),” and that students have certain
privacy and confidentiality rights.61 The Code bars the University from dis-
closing information to anyone not connected with student disciplinary pro-
ceedings except as required by law.62 The Code also states the University
“will disclose the results of the proceeding, including sanctions imposed,
only to those who need to know for purposes of record keeping, enforce-
55. Krakauer I, 381 P.3d 524, 535 (Mont. 2019).
56. Krakauer II, 445 P.3d 201, 205 (Mont. 2019).
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-25-515.
58. Krakauer I, 381 P.3d 524, 532.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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ment of the sanctions, further proceedings, eligibility for participation in
certain University activities, or compliance with federal or state laws.”63
The 2020–2021 Grizzly Athletics Student-Athlete Handbook describes
student records as “subject to state and federal privacy protection, as well as
University policies regarding confidentiality.”64 The Handbook’s provision
on misconduct records includes a note that closely resembles the language
of FERPA:
The University will disclose to an alleged victim the final results of a disci-
plinary proceeding against an alleged perpetrator. The University will also
disclose to anyone the final results of a disciplinary proceeding if it deter-
mines that the student-athlete is an alleged perpetrator of a crime of violence
or a non-forcible sex offense, and with respect to the allegation made, the
student-athlete has committed a violation of the Student Conduct Code or
the Discrimination and Sexual Harassment policy.65
This provision was also included in the 2019 Handbook, the governing edi-
tion at the time the Court decided Krakauer II.66
The Student Code of Conduct and Student-Athlete Handbook gener-
ally protect student records from disclosure. However, they also include
exceptions for the release of certain disciplinary proceeding results and
those requested by court order or subpoena.
III. THE KRAKAUER CASES
A. Krakauer I
In 2012, several sexual assault allegations arose at the University of
Montana (“University”).67 Those allegations grew into a broader cultural
concern about sexual assault on and near campus.68 In 2014, as a part of his
research for a book about sexual assault at the University, author Jon
Krakauer requested the Commissioner of Higher Education Clayton Chris-
tian (“Commissioner”) release the educational records of a specific Univer-
sity student in connection with one of the 2012 allegations.69 The Commis-
sioner denied the request, and Krakauer filed a petition in the First Judicial
District Court of Montana.70 Krakauer I and II resulted.
63. Id.
64. GRIZZLY ATHLETICS STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 11 (2020-2021), https://
s3.amazonaws.com/sidearm.sites/gogriz.com/documents/2020/7/28/2020_21_SA_Handbook.pdf.
65. Id. at 11–12.
66. GRIZZLY ATHLETICS STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 11–12 (2018–2019); GRIZZLY ATHLETICS
STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 11–12 (2019–2020).
67. Doe v. University of Mont., No. CV 12-77-M-DLC, 2012 WL 2416481, at *1 (D. Mont. June
26, 2012).
68. Krakauer I, 381 P.3d 524, 526 (Mont. 2016).
69. Id. at 526–27.
70. Id. at 527.
9
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In support of his petition, Krakauer referenced unsealed court docu-
ments from Doe v. University of Montana,71 which showed that a Univer-
sity student accused student John Doe (“Doe”) of raping her in her apart-
ment.72 Dean of Students Charles Couture determined Doe committed sex-
ual intercourse without consent and recommended Doe’s immediate
expulsion for violating the University of Montana Student Code of Con-
duct.73 Doe appealed to the University Court, which concluded Doe had
committed the offense and that he should be expelled.74 Doe then requested
that the President of the University, Royce Engstrom, review the holding
per the Code.75 Engstrom upheld the court’s findings and recommended
Doe’s expulsion.76 Finally, Doe appealed Engstrom’s decision to the Com-
missioner.77 The Commissioner’s review of the case, which is not a part of
the record, was the information Krakauer sought.78
In his request of the Commissioner, Krakauer asserted that the “Doe”
in Doe v. University of Montana was the starting quarterback of the Univer-
sity’s football team, who was acquitted of rape in a nationally publicized
criminal trial in 2013.79 Krakauer theorized “the Commissioner must have
overturned the University’s decision to expel Doe,” because he remained
enrolled as a student and a member of the football team.80 The Commis-
sioner denied Krakauer’s request and stated that because he requested Doe’s
records specifically, FERPA and Montana Code Annotated § 20-25-515
prohibited the records release.81 Krakauer sued, asserting his right to know
under Article 2, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution.82 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Krakauer and ordered the Commis-
sioner release Doe’s records.83 The Commissioner appealed.84
In Krakauer I, rather than acknowledge them as separate, the Court
merged the privacy protections found in FERPA, state law, and the Univer-
sity of Montana Student Code of Conduct to create a new “legislatively-
cloaked, enhanced privacy protection” for students.85 The Court found Doe
71. 2012 WL 2416481.
72. Krakauer I, 381 P.3d at 526.
73. Id. at 526.
74. Id. at 526–27.










85. Krakauer II, 445 P.3d 201, 206 (Mont. 2019).
10
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did not have notice his records were subject to disclosure, despite the ex-
plicit exceptions found within federal and state law and the University Stu-
dent Code of Conduct.86 Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s
decision and remanded the case for an in-camera review of Doe’s records.87
The Court ordered the district court to determine whether a FERPA excep-
tion allowed the records to be released if the Commissioner’s final ruling
was against Doe.88 The Court also instructed the district court to re-balance
Krakauer’s right to know with Doe’s newly-created enhanced student right
to privacy; determine whether redacting Doe’s personally identifiable infor-
mation affected the analysis; and determine which records, if any, could be
released.89
On remand, the district court granted Doe’s motion to intervene in the
case and conducted the in-camera review of his records.90 The court applied
the two-part Katz test and concluded Doe did not have a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, because his information was available through unsealed
court documents and media coverage.91 Further, even if Doe had an expec-
tation of privacy, the court determined it did not clearly exceed the merits
of public disclosure.92 The court ordered the Commissioner to release Doe’s
records to Krakauer.93 The Commissioner and Doe appealed, and Krakauer
II ensued.94
B. Krakauer II
1. Krakauer II Majority
On appeal, the Commissioner and Doe argued students’ enhanced pri-
vacy interests meant Doe had an expectation of privacy requirement in his
educational records.95 Krakauer argued the Grizzly Athletics Student-Ath-
lete Handbook informed Doe he had less privacy as a student athlete and
would be subject to increased scrutiny.96 Krakauer also reiterated the al-
ready public nature of Doe’s records barred him from asserting any expec-
tation of privacy.97
86. Id. at 208.
87. Krakauer I, 381 P.3d at 535.
88. Id. at 531.
89. Id. at 534–35.
90. Krakauer II, 445 P.3d at 205.
91. Id. at 205.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 204.
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The Montana Supreme Court merged the federal, state, and university
privacy analyses. First, the Court commenced the Katz two-part test to de-
termine whether Doe had a right to privacy in his student records.98 In de-
termining whether Doe had an actual or subjective expectation of privacy,
the Court turned to its prior analysis on notice.99 That analysis dictates that
“[if] the person had notice his records were subject to public disclosure or
the public entity already made them publicly available, then he cannot have
an actual or subjective expectation of privacy in the records.”100 The Court
acknowledged FERPA, Montana Code Annotated § 20-25-515, and the
University of Montana Student Code of Conduct provide exceptions for
student record releases in the event of a court subpoena.101 Nevertheless,
the Court held these statutes and policies deprived Doe of adequate no-
tice.102 In fact, the Court went further and stated, “[q]uite the opposite, the
statutes and policies provide students like Doe with steadfast assurances
that the university system will affirmatively protect their records from dis-
closure, just as the University and the Commissioner have done here.”103
Thus, the Court refuted Krakauer’s argument that Doe had a diminished
right of privacy under the Grizzly Athletics Student-Athlete Handbook.104
Krakauer’s argument regarding the public nature of Doe’s records was
also countered.105 The Court reasoned “information contained in a student’s
educational records is broader than that offered during a public criminal
trial, which is governed by rules of evidence, burdens of proof, and consti-
tutional protections not applicable to educational records.”106 Public knowl-
edge of Doe’s records did not negate his expectation of privacy in them.107
As a result, the Court held Doe had an actual or subjective expectation of
privacy in his records.108
The Court then turned to the second prong of the Katz test and ana-
lyzed whether society would recognize Doe’s expectation of privacy as rea-
sonable.109 The Court distinguished Krakauer II from its previous decisions
where it held society is less willing to recognize public officials’ expecta-
tion of privacy as reasonable, explaining, “Doe was not, for example, a law
enforcement officer, teacher, or government official, nor was he charged
98. Id.
99. Id. at 207.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 208.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 210.
106. Id. at 209.
107. Id. at 208–09.
108. Id. at 209–10.
109. Id. at 210.
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with performing public duties. Doe was a student.”110 Notably, the statuto-
rily-enhanced student privacy interest again played a significant role in the
Court’s analysis:
Were we to expand the group of public officials having a reduced privacy
interest to include, as suggested here, any student in whom the public is
interested, the enhanced student privacy interest would be rendered mean-
ingless. Statutes enacted by our legislature embody public policy. The fed-
eral and state statutes providing enhanced privacy protections support the
idea that society is willing to recognize Doe’s privacy expectation is reason-
able. Accordingly, we conclude society is willing to recognize as reasonable
Doe’s actual or subjective expectation of privacy in his educational
records.111
Ultimately, the Court reversed the district court’s order to release Doe’s
records and dismissed Krakauer’s petition with prejudice.112
2. Justice James Rice, Concurrence in Part
In his concurrence in part, Justice Rice agreed Doe had an enhanced
privacy interest in his records society would find reasonable, and he agreed
with the reversal of the district court. However, Justice Rice stated Doe did
have notice his records could be released, because FERPA and the Student
Conduct Code inform students of that possibility. Further, Justice Rice
stated that when weighing the constitutional rights, there is a presumption
favoring the release of documents. Finally, he determined the Court need
not reach a “yes-or-no, all-or-nothing decision” about Doe’s records. He
determined Krakauer’s request should have been honored to an extent by
releasing the records with redactions. Justice Rice reasoned the right to
know outweighed Doe’s enhanced right to privacy.113
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court’s Inequitable Distribution of Student Privacy Protections
and Exceptions in Constitutional Balancing
The Krakauer II Court enhanced student privacy rights with FERPA,
Montana student record law, and University law, but it failed to bolster the
right to know with those statutes’ exceptions. In his concurrence in part,
Justice Rice illustrated this foundational issue in the majority’s reasoning
by referencing Doe v. University of Montana:
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 214.
113. Id. at 215 (Rice, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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[L]ost in all of this is the valid and compelling interest of the people in
knowing what the University of Montana is up to. It has been established
that the prevalent and long-standing approach of the federal courts is to re-
ject secret proceedings. There are very few exceptions to this rule. The prin-
ciple of openness in the conduct of the business of public institutions is all
the more important here, where the subject matter of the litigation is a chal-
lenge to the administrative disciplinary process of a state university.114
Justice Rice expanded on the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Montana’s reasoning and stated, “[T]he people of the state simply
must be able to learn about and know—in some degree—a decision made
by the Commissioner of Higher Education about a University matter, in-
cluding a matter involving a student.”115 Further, the issue in Krakauer II,
Justice Rice stated, was more than a mere human resource issue; it was in
fact, “a contested case before a high official in the state government, exer-
cising statewide authority.”116 As such, in this case, the public had a consti-
tutional right to know their government “[was] not engaged in inappropriate
conduct.”117 Justice Rice supposed such inappropriate conduct could entail
the Commissioner exhibiting favoritism towards Doe or succumbing to
outside influence in his decision making.118 In sum, Justice Rice concluded,
“Doe’s enhanced privacy right must be weighed and balanced against the
vital, democratic function of the public’s right to know these answers.”119
Justice Rice’s concurrence in part illustrates the heavy burden those
claiming a right to privacy must bear when confronted with the public’s
right to know. In such cases, there is a constitutional presumption in favor
of the right to know,120 and an individual must show her privacy interest
“clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”121 Thus, the plain lan-
guage of the right to know, and much of the Montana Supreme Court’s
precedent on constitutional balancing, weigh heavily in favor of the public’s
right to know. Any balancing the Court performed in Krakauer II should
have been conducted in step with this “long-standing principle of demo-
cratic theory . . . that the activities of government be public at all levels,”122
with an eye toward maintaining a “disclosure-oriented” government as was
intended by the authors of the right to know.123
114. Id. (Rice, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part (citing Doe v. University of Mont., No.






120. Great Falls Tribune v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 82 P.3d 876, 886 (Mont. 2003).
121. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 (emphasis added).
122. APPLEGATE, supra note 8, at 111.
123. Id. at 112–13.
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The Court in Krakauer II, however, opted to enhance the right to pri-
vacy with federal, state, and University of Montana law, but it ignored the
exceptions found within those same laws. Had the Court given due weight
to those exceptions, its privacy analysis would have logically produced the
opposite outcome—that Doe’s right to privacy did not clearly exceed the
merits of his records’ disclosure.
1. FERPA and Montana Code Annotated
As the Court articulated in Krakauer I, “FERPA contains several non-
consensual exceptions that permit an institution to release educational
records,” despite its general prohibition on student record releases.124 Spe-
cifically, FERPA allows for the release of:
[T]he final results of any disciplinary proceeding . . . against a student who
is an alleged perpetrator of any crime of violence . . . or a nonforcible sex
offense, if the institution determines as a result of that disciplinary proceed-
ing that the student committed a violation of the institution’s rules or poli-
cies with respect to such crime or offense.125
Krakauer argued this exception “explicitly authorizes disclosure of records
related to the Commissioner’s decision since it is, undisputedly, the ‘final
result’ of the [MUS]’s disciplinary proceeding against [the named stu-
dent].”126
In Krakauer II, the Court again used FERPA’s general protection of
student records as a building block for the Court’s newly-created enhanced
student privacy right. However, the disciplinary proceeding exception to
FERPA played no part in the Court’s analysis. This could be—as Krakauer
suspects—due to the fact the Commissioner found Doe did not commit a
violent or nonforcible sex crime.127 In such a case, the exception would not
apply because there would be no offense nor any perpetrator’s information
to disclose. Still, if the Court allowed the general FERPA provision to en-
hance privacy rights, it should have given equal weight to the right to know
with an analysis of the disciplinary proceeding exception.
FERPA includes a second exception to its general prohibition of re-
cord releases, which allows disclosure “in compliance with judicial order,
or pursuant to any lawfully issued subpoena.”128 As the Court stated in
Krakauer I, “FERPA thus generally authorizes the release of records upon
124. Krakauer I, 381 P.3d 524, 531 (Mont. 2016).
125. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 § 1232g(b)(6)(B) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 116–259).
126. Krakauer I, 381 P.3d at 531.
127. Id. at 527.
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orders from courts acting properly within their jurisdiction. Krakauer’s peti-
tion sought an order pursuant to this exception.”129 Similarly, Montana’s
student record law also allows disclosure pursuant to a subpoena.130 The
Court clarified in Krakauer I that “the Legislature intended student records
would be subject to release following legal process conducted ‘by a court or
tribunal of competent jurisdiction,’ and did not intend to restrict that legal
process exclusively to the issuance of a ‘subpoena,’ the purpose of which is
to compel a person’s attendance in a court or proceeding.”131 Further, the
Court held “[t]he statute is satisfied by the issuance of a court order upon
completion of that legal process.” The district court ordered the Commis-
sioner release Doe’s records in its Memorandum and Order.132 Accord-
ingly, the exception appears to have been met. Nonetheless, the Court in
Krakauer II declined to bolster the right to know with the seemingly heavy
weight of the exceptions and construed the state student privacy law as
further enhancing student privacy rights.133
2. The University of Montana Student Code of Conduct and Grizzly
Athletics Student-Athlete Handbook
The University of Montana Student Code of Conduct bars the Univer-
sity from disclosing information to anyone not connected with student dis-
ciplinary proceedings except as required by law.134 Also under the Code,
the University “will disclose” the results of disciplinary proceedings in or-
der to comply with federal or state laws.135 Further, the current edition of
the Student-Athlete Handbook states the University “will disclose . . . to
anyone the final results of a disciplinary proceeding if it determines that the
student-athlete is an alleged perpetrator of a crime of violence or a non-
forcible sex offense.”136
Thus, just as federal and state student record laws provided, the Uni-
versity’s laws generally protect records but allow for specific and weighty
exceptions in the event of a disciplinary hearing or in order to comply with
federal or state laws. Again, Doe’s records appear to fall squarely within the
exceptions to the general prohibition of disclosure for the same reasons dis-
cussed in the federal and state law analysis above. And, again, the Court
129. 381 P.3d at 531–32.
130. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-25-515.
131. 381 P.3d at 532.
132. Id.
133. Krakauer II, 445 P.3d 201, 207 (Mont. 2019).
134. THE UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT 3 (2020), https://www.umt.edu/
student-affairs/community-standards/student-code-of-conduct-2020-pdf (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. GRIZZLY ATHLETICS STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 11–12 (2020-2021).
16
Montana Law Review, Vol. 82 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-2\MON205.txt unknown Seq: 17 31-AUG-21 13:01
2021 STUDENT PRIVACY OVER RECORD DISCLOSURE 445
declined to account for the exceptions and instead determined the Univer-
sity laws also enhance student privacy rights.
If the Court had given due weight to the right to know by performing
an analysis of the FERPA, state, and University laws’ exceptions, it would
have likely found that Doe did have notice his records would be subject to
disclosure and therefore did not have an expectation of privacy. These con-
clusions, contrary to the actual Krakauer II decision, tip the constitutional
balance in favor of disclosure. These statutes’ exceptions, if “taken to-
gether” as the Court did, balance out—if not completely negate—the “statu-
torily-enhanced” student right to privacy. In such a case, Doe’s right to
privacy could not “clearly exceed” the merits of his records’ disclosure.
This result aligns with the authors’ intent in drafting the constitutional right
to know, accounts for the presumption in favor of disclosure, and is echoed
across years of Montana Supreme Court precedent.
B. The Court’s Enhancement of Privacy Rights with the Futility of
Redacted Records
The Court in Krakauer II further contradicted precedent when it held
futility of redaction weighs in favor of a student’s right to privacy. The
Court determined in Yellowstone County v. Billings Gazette137 that redac-
tion can protect privacy and allow the disclosure of relevant information to
the public.138 Further, the Court stated Montana’s right to know permits
“access to the ‘widest breadth of information possible,’ even where the in-
dividuals whose privacy interests were implicated did not work in the pub-
lic realm.”139 Even more importantly, in Pioneer Press, the Court upheld
the release of redacted documents even though the school board empha-
sized that the newspaper already had the students’ identifying informa-
tion.140 Additionally, in Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County,141 the
Court held the public’s prior knowledge of the information sought weighed
against a teacher’s claim that her privacy rights were violated.142 These
cases were in line with decades of precedent that demonstrated the right to
know outweighed the right to privacy, and, when possible, redacted docu-
ments must be released to the public.
The Court in Krakauer II, however, determined futility of redaction
weighed in favor of the right to privacy, in direct contradiction of Pioneer
137. 143 P.3d 135 (Mont. 2006).
138. Id. at 141.
139. Id. (quoting Lincoln Cty. Comm’n v. Nixon, 968 P.2d 1141, 1144 (1998)).
140. Board of Trustees, Cut Bank Public Schools v. Cut Bank Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d 482, 489
(Mont. 2007).
141. 106 P.3d 548 (Mont. 2005).
142. Id. at 552.
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Press.143 Further, the Court held no records whatsoever could be released,
“largely turning upon the wording of Krakauer’s request for the records.”144
Even if redaction of Doe’s records would have been futile, and notwith-
standing the Pioneer Press decision, the records should have been released
to the extent possible. In his concurrence in part, Justice Rice stated this
would entail a “limited release of information that discloses the decision the
Commissioner made and the grounds upon which he made it.”145
Additionally, the Court’s flawed application of Svaldi to the facts of
Krakauer II further confused the right to privacy analysis. The Court distin-
guished Svaldi simply by reiterating that Doe is not a public official as the
teacher was in Svaldi.146 There, the Court stated, “Svaldi cannot seriously
claim her privacy rights were violated by the release of the initial offense
report when it was already public knowledge that the allegations were
against her.”147 In Krakauer II, however, the Court based its determination
to the contrary on the fact Doe was not in a “position of public trust.”148
This assertion references only a select portion of the Court’s reasoning in
Svaldi. The Court determined Svaldi’s privacy rights were not violated pri-
marily because the records at issue had already been released, not because
she was in a position of public trust.149 The reasoning in Krakauer II shifts
the futility of redaction to weigh in favor of privacy rights instead of public
disclosure. The Court departs from its Svaldi analysis and decades of prece-
dent.
V. CONCLUSION
Viewed in light of the Montana Supreme Court’s recent decisions
favoring the right to privacy over the right to know, the Krakauer II holding
comes as no surprise. In those cases, rather than give credence to the long-
standing presumption in favor of open government, the Court instead chose
to bolster the right to privacy by placing the “compelling interest” burden
on the party seeking disclosure. In Krakauer II, the Court opted to
strengthen the right to privacy by paying special attention to the protections
of FERPA, Montana statutes, and University of Montana law. However, the
Court ignored the explicit exceptions found within those same laws. Paying
equal attention to these exceptions and distributing their due weight to the
143. Krakauer II, 445 P.3d 201, 211 (Mont. 2019).
144. Id. at 215 (Rice, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
145. Id. (Rice, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 209.
147. Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge Cty., 106 P.3d 548, 553 (Mont. 2005).
148. Krakauer II, 445 P.3d at 209.
149. Svaldi, 106 P.3d at 553.
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right to know would have produced a more just outcome aligned with Mon-
tana’s constitutional history and precedent.
The Court did state that it “does not foreclose the possibility” the pub-
lic’s right to know could outweigh a student’s right to privacy even where
redaction is futile and that the outcome will “depend on the facts of each
case.”150 Still, the Krakauer II decision will allow courts in future cases to
be selective about the factors they use in the constitutional balancing test to
stack even more weight in favor of the right to privacy.
150. Krakauer II, 445 P.3d at 213.
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